AT&T had added signing and attestations to its standardized, reusable build workflows. That raised the next question: now that we have cryptographically verifiable evidence, what do we do with it? The answer: a valid signature is not deployment approval. A signature says who built an image and that it hasn’t changed. It doesn’t say whether the image meets the rules of the place it is going.
| Environment | Requires | Result |
| Development | Verified provenance | Admit |
| Production | Provenance and a signed SBOM | Deny: SBOM missing |
Checking at promotion isn’t enough on its own. The destination may need extra evidence, requirements change, some attestations are time sensitive, and requests can come from GitOps, a pipeline or kubectl. Promotion approves an artifact; admission evaluates this request against the policy that applies now.
The platform team wanted shared controls that app teams don’t each rebuild, support for more than one trust root, and enough retained evidence to explain any decision later, with measured latency, high availability and deliberate failure behavior.