NIST SP 800-218 and Kubernetes: what policy can enforce

NIST SP 800-218, the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), describes how software is built, not how it runs, and it never names Kubernetes. Kubernetes admission policy can enforce three of its 42 active practices: approved image sources, provenance attestations and a secure baseline for deployed pods. CI gates cover eleven more. The other 28 need records or people.
What SP 800-218 asks for
SP 800-218 is the SSDF, version 1.1, published in February 2022. We checked the final text on the NIST publication page and its PDF on 2026-11-19. Its practices sit under four groups: Prepare the Organization (PO), Protect the Software (PS), Produce Well-Secured Software (PW) and Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV). Each practice has an ID such as PW.4.1. The abstract calls them “high-level secure software development practices that can be integrated into each SDLC implementation”, which is why none of them names a platform. Five IDs are marked as moved or merged in v1.1: PW.3.1, PW.3.2, PW.4.3, PW.4.5 and PW.5.2. The table below covers the 42 practices that keep their own statement.
How this guide labels each practice
Each practice gets one of three labels. A practice is enforceable at admission when a check at create or update time can read the field that shows it, such as an image reference or a pod setting. A practice is enforceable in CI only when a pipeline step can fail the build or the release. Everything else is not enforceable by policy. That includes decisions, documents and reviews by people, even when a policy can later record that they happened. The label describes the check, not how much the practice matters.
Practice to policy table
The labels are our classification. The IDs are NIST’s, and the descriptions are paraphrased.
| Practice | What it asks for, paraphrased | Label | How the check works |
|---|---|---|---|
| PO.1.1 | Document security requirements for development infrastructure and processes | Not enforceable by policy | Requirements document |
| PO.1.2 | Document security requirements for organization-developed software | Not enforceable by policy | Requirements document |
| PO.1.3 | Communicate requirements to suppliers of commercial components | Not enforceable by policy | Supplier communication and contracts |
| PO.2.1 | Define and maintain roles across the SDLC | Not enforceable by policy | Role records |
| PO.2.2 | Provide role-based training | Not enforceable by policy | Training records |
| PO.2.3 | Get management commitment to secure development | Not enforceable by policy | Management decision |
| PO.3.1 | Specify which tools each toolchain includes and how they connect | Enforceable in CI only | Pipeline template fails when a required tool step is missing |
| PO.3.2 | Follow recommended practices to deploy and maintain tools | Not enforceable by policy | Operations practice |
| PO.3.3 | Configure tools to generate artifacts of their security support | Enforceable in CI only | Pipeline step fails when the expected artifact is missing |
| PO.4.1 | Define criteria for software security checks | Not enforceable by policy | Decision; the CI gates enforce the criteria under PW.7.2 |
| PO.4.2 | Gather and protect the information the criteria need | Not enforceable by policy | Process |
| PO.5.1 | Separate and protect each development environment | Not enforceable by policy | Outside cluster admission |
| PO.5.2 | Harden development endpoints | Not enforceable by policy | Endpoint management |
| PS.1.1 | Store code with least-privilege access | Not enforceable by policy | Access controls on the code host |
| PS.2.1 | Make integrity verification information available to acquirers | Enforceable in CI only | Pipeline signs artifacts and publishes the verification data |
| PS.3.1 | Archive release files and supporting data | Enforceable in CI only | Pipeline stores the archive and fails when a step is missing |
| PS.3.2 | Collect and share provenance data for all components, such as an SBOM | Enforceable at admission | Kyverno verifyImages can require a signed attestation and check its JSON through conditions; admission cannot check that the SBOM is complete |
| PW.1.1 | Model threats and attack surface | Not enforceable by policy | Design work |
| PW.1.2 | Track security requirements, risks and design decisions | Not enforceable by policy | Records |
| PW.1.3 | Use standardized security features and services | Not enforceable by policy | Design choice |
| PW.2.1 | Review the design against the security requirements | Not enforceable by policy | Design review by people |
| PW.4.1 | Acquire and maintain well-secured third-party components | Enforceable at admission | Registry allowlist on container images; does not see libraries inside them |
| PW.4.2 | Create well-secured in-house components | Not enforceable by policy | Development practice |
| PW.4.4 | Verify acquired components meet requirements through their life cycle | Enforceable in CI only | Dependency checks in the pipeline |
| PW.5.1 | Follow secure coding practices | Enforceable in CI only | Code analysis catches some issues; the rest needs review |
| PW.6.1 | Use compiler, interpreter and build tools that offer security features | Enforceable in CI only | Build step fails when an approved tool or option is missing |
| PW.6.2 | Choose and configure build tool features | Enforceable in CI only | Build step fails when the approved configuration is missing |
| PW.7.1 | Decide whether code review or code analysis is used | Not enforceable by policy | Decision |
| PW.7.2 | Perform code review or analysis and triage the findings | Enforceable in CI only | Pipeline runs analysis and fails on findings above the threshold |
| PW.8.1 | Decide which executable testing is needed | Not enforceable by policy | Decision |
| PW.8.2 | Scope and run executable tests and record the results | Enforceable in CI only | Pipeline runs tests and fails on failures |
| PW.9.1 | Define a secure baseline for each security-relevant setting | Enforceable at admission | Pod Security Admission or a policy on deployed pods; does not change the software’s own defaults |
| PW.9.2 | Implement and document the default settings | Not enforceable by policy | Software defaults and documentation |
| RV.1.1 | Gather vulnerability reports from users and public sources | Not enforceable by policy | Intake and triage |
| RV.1.2 | Review and test code for vulnerabilities not yet found | Enforceable in CI only | Scheduled scans in the pipeline |
| RV.1.3 | Maintain a vulnerability disclosure and remediation policy | Not enforceable by policy | Policy and process |
| RV.2.1 | Analyze each vulnerability for risk | Not enforceable by policy | Analysis |
| RV.2.2 | Plan and implement risk responses | Not enforceable by policy | Exception and remediation records |
| RV.3.1 | Find the root cause of each vulnerability | Not enforceable by policy | Analysis |
| RV.3.2 | Analyze root causes over time for patterns | Not enforceable by policy | Analysis |
| RV.3.3 | Review the software for similar vulnerabilities | Not enforceable by policy | Code review |
| RV.3.4 | Review the SDLC and update it to prevent recurrence | Not enforceable by policy | Process |
Admission controls for three practices
Kubernetes ships ValidatingAdmissionPolicy, which evaluates CEL expressions and can report failures in an Audit action. The image rule below uses Kyverno’s policy library instead, because it already covers the container image fields. Pod Security Admission handles the baseline.
Approved image sources (PW.4.1)
PW.4.1 asks you to acquire and maintain well-secured components from third parties. For container images, the check a cluster can make is where each image came from. The Kyverno policy library includes a ValidatingPolicy that restricts image pulls to approved prefixes. Its description says that “Requiring use of known, approved registries helps reduce threat exposure by ensuring image pulls only come from them.” It matches pods, the usual workload controllers, jobs, cron jobs and ephemeral containers. It does not match custom resources that create pods. The policy ships in audit mode, so test it there first and read the reports before you change the action.
apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1
kind: ValidatingPolicy
metadata:
name: restrict-image-registries
annotations:
policies.kyverno.io/title: Restrict Image Registries in VPOL
policies.kyverno.io/category: Best Practices, EKS Best Practices in VPOL
policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
policies.kyverno.io/minversion: 1.19.1
kyverno.io/kubernetes-version: "1.30"
policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod
policies.kyverno.io/description: Images from unknown, public registries can be of dubious quality and may not be scanned and secured, representing a high degree of risk. Requiring use of known, approved registries helps reduce threat exposure by ensuring image pulls only come from them. This policy validates that container images only originate from the registry `eu.foo.io` or `bar.io`. Use of this policy requires customization to define your allowable registries.
spec:
validationActions:
- Audit
evaluation:
background:
enabled: true
matchConstraints:
resourceRules:
- apiGroups:
- ""
apiVersions:
- v1
operations:
- CREATE
- UPDATE
resources:
- pods
- apiGroups:
- apps
apiVersions:
- v1
operations:
- CREATE
- UPDATE
resources:
- deployments
- statefulsets
- daemonsets
- replicasets
- apiGroups:
- batch
apiVersions:
- v1
operations:
- CREATE
- UPDATE
resources:
- jobs
- cronjobs
- apiGroups:
- ""
apiVersions:
- v1
operations:
- CREATE
- UPDATE
resources:
- replicationcontrollers
- apiGroups:
- ""
apiVersions:
- v1
operations:
- UPDATE
resources:
- pods/ephemeralcontainers
variables:
- name: podSpec
expression: "object.kind == 'CronJob' ? object.spec.jobTemplate.spec.template.spec : (has(object.spec.template) ? object.spec.template.spec : object.spec)"
- name: allContainers
expression: variables.podSpec.containers + variables.podSpec.?initContainers.orValue([]) + variables.podSpec.?ephemeralContainers.orValue([])
validations:
- expression: variables.allContainers.all(container, (has(exceptions.allowedImages) && container.image in exceptions.allowedImages) || container.image.startsWith('eu.foo.io/') || container.image.startsWith('bar.io/'))
message: Unknown image registry.
The prefixes eu.foo.io/ and bar.io/ are the policy’s example values. Replace them with your own registries before you use the policy. The expression also accepts images listed in exceptions.allowedImages, so an exact image can pass without widening a prefix. The check reads image strings, so the approved list is only as good as your naming.
Provenance attestations (PS.3.2)
PS.3.2 asks for provenance data for every component of a release, and NIST gives the software bill of materials as an example. A cluster cannot create that data, but it can ask whether an image carries it. Kyverno’s verifyImages rule can require attestations, which the docs describe as “signed metadata” checked for the image. The same rule can require digests. Kubernetes says that “Digests are a unique identifier for a specific version of an image” and that “digests are fixed”. A signature and conditions check shows that the producer attached a signed attestation with the fields you test for. It does not show that the SBOM lists every dependency.
Pod baseline (PW.9.1)
PW.9.1 asks you to define a secure baseline: how each security-relevant setting is configured so the defaults are secure. The software side of that belongs to whoever ships the software. A cluster can only check the pods you deploy. The Pod Security Standards restricted profile names the fields to check, and Pod Security Admission enforces the profile per namespace. One restricted rule reads “Containers must be required to run as non-root users.” Set the mode with a namespace label, and start with audit.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: agent-workloads
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
This label does not satisfy PW.9.1 on its own, because the practice is about the software’s defaults. It enforces a baseline on the workloads you run.
CI gates for eleven practices
Eleven practices fit a pipeline gate. A gate is a step that fails the build or the release, so the check runs on every change. The four gates below cover the set. Each one needs a threshold or an approved list that your team writes down.
- Run code analysis and tests on every change, and fail on findings or failures above the threshold you set. This covers PW.5.1, PW.7.2, PW.8.2 and RV.1.2.
- Pin the build tools and their security options in the pipeline template, and fail when a required tool or option is missing. This covers PO.3.1, PO.3.3, PW.6.1 and PW.6.2.
- Check dependencies against your approved list and fail on anything unapproved. This covers PW.4.4.
- Sign artifacts, publish their verification data and archive each release, and fail the release if any step is missing. This covers PS.2.1 and PS.3.1.
Keep each threshold in the same repository as its pipeline, so an auditor can see what the gate checked and when it changed.
Gotchas from the fine print
- SP 800-218 never names Kubernetes. Every Kubernetes mapping here is ours, and a reviewer should be able to trace each one to a practice ID.
- The five moved or merged IDs (PW.3.1, PW.3.2, PW.4.3, PW.4.5 and PW.5.2) point to other practices in v1.1. An audit that cites PW.3.1 should name the version and the practice it means.
- Admission checks the object being admitted. The image policy sees image strings, not the libraries inside each image, so PW.4.4 stays in CI.
- Kyverno’s digest handling changes objects. The docs say mutateDigest “converts tags to digests” and that it is true by default, so a pod spec can differ after admission. Check the reports for that change before you rely on the digest.
- PW.9.1 is about the software’s defaults. A namespace label checks what you deploy, which is a narrower job.
A checklist before you map SSDF
- Cite SP 800-218 version 1.1, the practice IDs from it, and the date you read the text.
- Label each practice with one of the three classes, and write down why.
- For each admission row, run the policy in audit mode and read the reports per workload.
- For each CI row, add the gate to the pipeline and confirm it fails on a deliberately bad change in a test branch.
- For each remaining row, name the record that holds the evidence and the person who keeps it.
Enforcing this with Kyverno
Kyverno covers the two image rows in this guide: the registry policy and the attestation check. Pod Security Admission covers the baseline row without an extra tool. The CI rows run in your pipeline, and the rest need records kept by people. For the wider approach to evidence, read the continuous compliance hub. For the tool itself, read the Kyverno project page. The same method for other frameworks is in the NIST SP 800-190 controls post, the NIST CSF 2.0 post, the SEBI CSCRF post and the DORA post.
Sources checked on 2026-11-19: the NIST SP 800-218 publication page and PDF, the Kubernetes pages on container images, ValidatingAdmissionPolicy, Pod Security Standards and Pod Security Admission, and the Kyverno documentation for verifyImages rules and restrict-image-registries policy.
Frequently asked questions
Does NIST SP 800-218 mention Kubernetes?
No. SP 800-218, the Secure Software Development Framework, describes practices for the software development lifecycle. It does not name Kubernetes, pods or admission controllers. To use it on a cluster, you map each practice to something a policy engine can read. The table in this guide is our own reading of the practices, not a NIST artifact, so cite it as ours.
Which SSDF practices can an admission policy enforce?
Three of the 42 active practices can be enforced at admission: PS.3.2 for provenance attestations, PW.4.1 for approved image sources, and PW.9.1 for the settings of deployed pods. Each covers only what the cluster can see. A policy can confirm that a signed attestation with the fields you test for is attached to an image, but it cannot confirm that the software bill of materials inside it is complete.
Why do dependency checks belong in CI and not in admission?
Admission sees the image reference and the pod spec. It does not see the libraries packed inside an image, so it cannot tell whether a dependency has a known flaw or a forbidden license. The pipeline has the full dependency list at build time, so PW.4.4 is a CI gate. Admission can still block images from unapproved registries, which covers the sourcing half of PW.4.1.
Should SSDF policies start in audit mode?
Yes. The Kyverno registry policy in this guide ships with the Audit validation action, so it reports violations without rejecting workloads. Read the reports per workload, fix each failure or record it with an owner, and change the action only after the report is clean for the namespaces you run.