
Kubernetes
Check a subagent's OpenShell policy against a boundary
OpenShell's docs call a maximum-access policy a boundary. The prover checks that a subagent's policy allows nothing beyond the parent's. Here is how to run it.
7 min read
Category
49 posts

Kubernetes
OpenShell's docs call a maximum-access policy a boundary. The prover checks that a subagent's policy allows nothing beyond the parent's. Here is how to run it.
7 min read

Kubernetes
OpenShell agents hold placeholders, not API keys. The supervisor swaps in the real key only where policy and the profile allow it. Models are called natively.
9 min read

Kubernetes
Write an OpenShell sandbox policy in YAML: set filesystem and Landlock rules at startup, scope each network rule to one binary, then verify changes live.
9 min read

Kubernetes
OpenShell, Agent Substrate and Kubernetes Agent Sandbox solve different parts of running AI agents. Compare what each manages, enforces and requires.
7 min read

Kubernetes
Find over-privileged AI agents by testing each agent's Kubernetes service account with kubectl auth can-i --as, checking escalation paths and reading audit logs
6 min read

Kubernetes
Build AI workflows on Kubernetes that stay deterministic: collect with Jobs, gate with CEL, and give the model one bounded step with only the fields it needs.
6 min read

AI
Give each custom AI agent its own service account or GitHub App identity, narrow its grants, use short-lived tokens, and log the person each agent acted for.
5 min read

Kubernetes
Give each AI agent a named Kubernetes service account, a short-lived projected token for one audience, and a SPIFFE ID from SPIRE when it crosses trust domains.
6 min read

Kubernetes
Give each AI agent its own service account, then write an audit policy that names that account. Without a policy file, the API server logs nothing at all.
6 min read

Kubernetes
A threat model for AI agents in Kubernetes maps each path an agent pod can reach to the admission, token, RBAC or network control that blocks it, per agent.
7 min read

AI
An agent's pods face admission control before they start. Its calls face runtime enforcement after. Here is where each one stops it, and where it doesn't.
5 min read

Kubernetes
Give each AI agent its own service account, bind it to a narrow Role, and point its pod at that account. RBAC has no deny rules, so grants are the limit.
5 min read